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Abstract 
Potentially anti-competitive practices, such as reverse payment agreements and strategic 
patenting, risk allowing pharmaceutical companies to block the entry of generic and 
innovative medicines, stifling competition and harming consumers. Such practices create 
particular challenges for developing countries. Policy coherence between the IP system 
and competition law must be strengthened in order to promote innovation and access to 
health technologies. 
 
 
Introduction  
 
Competition policy is an under-utilised tool. Policy coherence between the IP system and competition 
must be strengthened in order to promote to the full extent innovation and access to health 
technologies. Article 8(2) of the TRIPS Agreement provides flexibilities for governments to adopt 
competition law measures to prevent abuse of intellectual property rights, including IP rights related 
to the life sciences, namely the pharmaceutical industry and the biotechnology sector. Post-TRIPS, 
some countries have implemented competition laws but in practice are not using these effectively. 
Even when competition authorities are active, many anti-competitive practices lack adequate 
attention. This is particularly striking in the pharmaceutical sector, where reverse payment 
agreements, for instance, are heavily litigated in the United States but have become the focus of 
attention in the European Union only more recently. Other business practices of pharmaceutical 
companies delay generic entry but competition authorities do not deal with this behaviour at all. 
 
One example of potentially anti-competitive behaviour is strategic patenting, or as pharmaceutical 
companies call it, the life-cycle management practices in the form of patent thickets, secondary 
patenting (also known as evergreening) and defensive patenting. These practices delay considerably 
generic entry and innovative medicines and, despite being highlighted by the European Commission 
in its Pharmaceutical Sector Inquiry in 2009 and more recently in the Trilateral Study of the WHO, 
WIPO and WTO in 2012, in reality competition authorities have failed to deal with such practices 
thus far. 
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Anti-competitive practices create particular challenges for the developing world, given that they allow 
pharmaceutical patent owners to extend patent monopolies and, when considered together with 
provisions on data and market exclusivity, can lead to significant barriers to innovation and access. It 
is imperative therefore that the full range of policy tools is utilised in favour of access to medicines. 
Strengthening policy coherence between the IP system and competition must be central to achieving 
the aims and objectives of the High-Level Panel. Used effectively, competition policy can be in the 
best interests of society. It is conducive to freedom of choice and lower prices while, potentially, also 
serving as an important driver for innovation and access. 
 
 
1. Competition law and access to medicines 
 
Article 8(1) of the TRIPS Agreement provides that: ‘Members may, in formulating or amending their 
laws and regulations, adopt measures necessary to protect public health and nutrition, and to promote 
the public interest in sectors of vital importance to their socio-economic and technological 
development, provided that such measures are consistent with the provisions of this Agreement.’ 
 
Article 8(2) of the TRIPS Agreement adds that: ‘Appropriate measures, provided that they are 
consistent with the provisions of this Agreement, may be needed to prevent the abuse of intellectual 
property rights by right holders or the resort to practices which unreasonably restrain trade or 
adversely affect the international transfer of technology.’ 
 
The TRIPS Agreement therefore explicitly permits WTO Members to employ specific measures in 
order to protect public health and nutrition, and to promote the public interest. In addition the TRIPS 
Agreement provides flexibilities for WTO Members to adopt measures to prevent abuse of intellectual 
property rights. 
 
The most widely discussed provision available in the TRIPS Agreement to facilitate access to 
medicines is compulsory licencing under Article 31, which allows a WTO Member to authorise use of 
the subject matter of a patent without the consent of the right holder. In practice, compulsory licensing 
is not commonly utilised by WTO Members due to its complex procedures, lack of technical capacity 
and bilateral pressure.1  
	
An alternative to compulsory licensing and, this submission argues, a more effective tool to protect 
public health and enhance access to medicines is by controlling abuses of intellectual property rights 
through competition law per se. Competition law is under-utilised but, when used effectively, can be 
an efficient mechanism in facilitating access to medicines. This is because courts and competition 
authorities are able to use competition law in order to balance the promotion of innovation via 
protection of intellectual property rights on the one hand, and protection of consumer welfare through 
competitive markets and lower prices by means of competition law on the other.  
 
 
 
1.1. Context 
 
																																								 																				
1  Duncan Matthews, ‘TRIPS Flexibilities and Access to Medicines in Developing Countries: The Problem with 
Technical Assistance and Free Trade Agreements’ (2005) 11 European Intellectual Property Review 421. 
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Governments have historically attempted to regulate competitive markets for goods and services, 
condemning monopolies and protecting trade and consumers. The United States Sherman Act of 1890 
and the Clayton Act of 1914 proscribe unlawful mergers and business practices, including anti-
competitive agreements and unilateral abuses. US antitrust law on restraint of trade had a major 
influence on the development of competition law in other countries. In the European Union anti-
competitive practices are addressed, inter alia, in Articles 101 and 102 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union. Yet despite the long tradition of competition law provisions in 
the US and EU, for the majority of developing countries competition law remains relatively new, 
implemented within the last 25 years.  
 
Unlike the binding minimum standards of intellectual property protection and enforcement enshrined 
in the TRIPS Agreement, there is no equivalent international legal instrument for competition law that 
would provide such minimum standards of protection. The absence of an international agreement on 
competition law has both advantages and disadvantages. On the one hand, as trade becomes 
increasingly global it also becomes particularly difficult for international companies to meet the 
differing requirements of competition law in foreign jurisdictions because of the variation in its 
application and interpretation, as well as the difficulties with extraterritorial enforcement. On the other 
hand, the absence of international standards provides flexibilities to the developing countries in their 
drafting, interpretation and enforcement. In the absence of an international agreement on competition 
law, developing countries are free to define their own policy objectives.  
 
 
 
1.2. Advantages of Competition Law  
 
 
1.2.1. Expeditious measures to facilitate access to medicines 
 
When utilising in-built flexibilities in the TRIPS Agreement to facilitate access to medicines, 
competition law can assist in ensuring expeditious measures, particularly in instances where the 
issuance of compulsory licences is envisaged. Article 31 establishes specific procedures that need to 
be followed before a compulsory licence can be issued but this can be cumbersome and time-
consuming.2 However, unlike other provisions in Article 31 of the TRIPS Agreement, paragraph (k) 
provides that WTO Members are not obliged to apply the conditions set forth in paragraph (b) to the 
effect that prior to such use, the proposed user has made efforts to obtain authorisation from the right 
holder on reasonable commercial terms and conditions and that such efforts have not been successful 
within a reasonable period of time, and paragraph (f) to the effect that any such use shall be authorised 
predominantly for the supply of the domestic market of the Member authorizing such use, where such 
use is permitted to remedy a practice determined after judicial or administrative process to be anti-
competitive. Article 31(k) further provides that the need to correct anti-competitive practices may be 
taken into account in determining the amount of remuneration in such cases, and that competition 
																																								 																				
2		 Duncan Matthews, ’WTO Decision on Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS 
Agreement and Public Health: A Solution to the Access to Essential Medicines Problem?’ (2004) 7(1) Journal of 
International Economic Law 73.	
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authorities shall have the authority to refuse termination of authorisation if and when the conditions 
which led to such authorisation are likely to recur.3  
 
Compulsory licences that are granted on the basis of competition law enforcement are specifically 
exempted from the requirement of prior negotiation before the grant of a licence. This decreases the 
time required to be spent negotiating with an IP owner and is potentially an important policy tool to 
facilitate access to medicines. 
 
 
1.2.2. Providing transparency and legal clarity 
 
Compulsory licencing is a complex procedure and may trigger an adverse reaction on the part of the 
patent owner, as well as raising the risk of bilateral trade pressure as a means of retaliation against the 
grant of a compulsory licence. Often a fear of such retaliation may force a country to abstain from 
such a policy approach. On the other hand, a decision of a competition authority may establish a 
useful legal precedent as a benchmark of policy application and guidelines for pharmaceutical 
companies that should be taken into account in their business strategies, as well as being used as a 
basis of a penalty imposed on a company that fails to follow such a precedent. This facilitates 
transparency and clarity in the application of the law and its approach to specific practices, including 
those that involve utilisation of intellectual property rights. As such, competition law can provide an 
effective alternative to compulsory licensing, in doing so creating precedents that will inform 
subsequent proceedings and incentives for firms to engage in voluntary licensing. 
 
 
1.2.3. The Hazel Tau case: using competition law to facilitate access to medicines 
 
One of the clearest examples of how competition law can facilitate access to medicine in a developing 
country context by prohibiting abuses of intellectual property rights is the Hazel Tau case in South 
Africa.4 The case arose when, in September 2002, 11 complainants of whom five where people living 
with HIV/AIDS (joined in February 2003 by a further two new complainants), brought an action 
against GlaxoSmithKline (GSK) and Boehringer Ingelheim (BI). The complainants alleged that the 
two companies were acting in violation of competition law by charging excessive prices for their 
ARV medicines and because of this they were directly responsible for the premature, predictable and 
avoidable loss of life, including of people living with HIV/AIDS.5 
 
On 16 October 2003 the Competition Commission’s investigation revealed that GSK and BI had 
																																								 																				
3  See also WTO, WIPO, WHO, ‘Promoting Access to Medical Technologies and Innovation: Intersection between 
public health, intellectual property and trade’ (2012) 76 <https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/publications_e/who-
wipo-wto_2013_e.htm.> accessed 10 May 2016. 
4  Hazel Tau et al. v. GlaxoSmithKline, Boehringer Ingelheim, et al. & Aids Healthcare Foundation et al v. 
GlaxoSmithKline, Boehringer Ingelheim, et al. Case Numbers: 2002sep226 & 2002jan357. See also Duncan 
Matthews, Intellectual Property, Human Rights and Development: The Role of NGOs and Social Movements 
(Edward Elgar 2011) 102-108. 
5  See Avafia, Tenu, Berger, Jonathan and Hartzenberg, Trudy, ‘The Ability of Select Sub-Saharan African Countries 
to Utilise TRIPS Flexibilities and Competition Law to Ensure a Sustainable Supply of Essential Medicines: A Study 
of Producing and Importing Countries’ (2006) 12 TRALAC Working Paper, Stellenbosch, South Africa: US 
Printers, 37; Berger, Jonathan, ‘Advancing Public Health by Others Means: Using Competition Policy’ in Pedro 
Roffe, Geoff Tansey and David Vivas-Eugui (eds.), Negotiating Health: Intellectual Property and Access to 
Medicines (London and Sterling, VA: Earthscan 2006) 197. 
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contravened the Competition Act of 1998 by refusing to license their patents on ARVs to generic 
manufacturers in return for a reasonable royalty.6  More specifically, GSK and BI were found to have 
abused their dominant positions in their respective ARV markets by engaging in restrictive practices 
consisting of: first, denying a competitor access to an essential facility; second, excessive pricing; and, 
third, engaging in an exclusionary act. According to the Commission, GSK and BI were using their 
exclusive patent rights to deny appropriate licences to other manufacturers, whilst simultaneously 
keeping their own prices high. The Commission referred the matter to the Competition Tribunal and 
asked it to make an order authorising any person to be able to exploit the patents to market generic 
medicines or fixed dose combinations that require the patents, on return for the payment of a 
reasonable royalty. The Commission also recommended a penalty of 10 per cent of the annual 
turnover of GSK and BI’s sale of ARVs in South Africa for each year that they were found to have 
violated the Act.7   
 
On 10 December 2003, the Competition Commission announced that it had concluded a settlement 
agreement with GSK which resulted in the grant of non-exclusive royalty-free voluntary licences and 
that it was in discussions with BI, also regarding a settlement agreement. At the time the complaint 
was lodged, both GSK and BI had already granted licences to South African pharmaceutical company 
Aspen Pharmacare, but the terms and conditions had been found by the Competition Commission to 
be unacceptable.8 Under the terms of the settlement agreement with GSK, the company undertook to: 
extend the voluntary licence granted previously to Aspen Pharmacare in respect of the public sector to 
include the private sector; grant up to three more voluntary licences on terms no less favourable than 
those granted to Aspen Pharmacare, based on reasonable criteria which include registration with the 
Medicines Control Council and the meeting of safety and efficacy obligations; permit the licensees to 
export the relevant ARV drugs to sub- Saharan African countries; where the licensee did not have the 
manufacturing capacity in South Africa, GSK would permit the importation of the drugs for 
distribution in South Africa; permit the licensees to combine the relevant ARV with other 
antiretroviral medicines; and charge royalties of no more than 5 per cent of the net sales of the 
relevant ARVs.9 
 
By the end of 2004, GSK and BI had licensed to five and three generic manufacturers respectively.10 
This resulted in significantly lower prices and improved sustainability of supply for the 
pharmaceutical products involved.11 
 
2. Anti-competitive practices in the pharmaceutical industry	
	
																																								 																				
6  Competition Commission Press Release, ‘Competition Commission finds pharmaceutical firms in contravention of 
the Competition Act’ (16 October 2003). 
7  ‘Commission Questions Conduct of Anti-retroviral Companies’ (2003) 14 Competition News 1 
<http://www.compcom.co.za/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/Dec-03-Newsletter.pdf> accessed 10 May 2016. 
8  Both GSK and BI had granted licences to South African generic drug company Aspen Pharmacare to manufacture 
and sell these patented ARVs in return for royalty payments that were in some cases as high as 40 per cent. In the 
case of GSK, sales by Aspen Pharmacare were permitted only to the South African public sector. See Berger (n 5) 
199; Matthews (n 4) 103.   
9  ‘Competition Commission concludes an agreement with pharmaceutical firms’ (2003) CPTech 
<http://www.cptech.org/ip/health/sa/cc12102003.html> accessed 10 May 2016.  
10  Avafia et al. (n 5) 32. 
11   Berger (n 5) 199. 
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One of the most effective ways to extend market exclusivity for pharmaceutical products is through 
strategic patenting and patent settlement agreements with generic competitors. In 2009, the European 
Commission Pharmaceutical Sector Inquiry concluded that such practices considerably delay or even 
block generic competition.12  
 
These anti-competitive practices may be divided into two groups: (a) anti-competitive agreements, 
including pay-for-delay agreements between originators and generic competitors and (b) anti-
competitive unilateral strategies including patenting practices and abuse of regulatory procedures by 
pharmaceutical companies or providing misleading information to state authorities. Such conduct 
allows pharmaceutical companies to extend market exclusivity beyond the initial patent monopoly 
and prevent entry of generic medicines to the market. The proliferation of such practices calls into 
question the effectiveness of intellectual property law enforcement mechanisms and highlights the 
relevance of competition law enforcement in this context.13 
 
 
 
2.1.  Anti-competitive practices  
 
 
2.1.1. Anti-competitive agreements: Reverse payment agreements 
 
In the US reverse payment agreements usually occur as a settlement of a patent dispute within the 
Hatch-Waxman Act procedure between the originator pharmaceutical company, i.e. the patent owner, 
that sues for patent infringement and the generic company, i.e. the alleged infringer, that countersues 
for patent invalidity. In the EU these agreements may occur out of court proceedings. The essence of 
these settlements is the agreement between the originator company and the generic company 
according to which the former agrees to transfer substantial amount of money (or other value transfers 
such as licences) in return to a promise by the latter not to enter the market.  
 
The pharmaceutical industry claims that these are lawful agreements under patent law as the patent 
grants exclusionary powers to its owner, and therefore, while the patent is pending, the originator 
company has the right to exclude its competitors. Also companies use the patent validity doctrine 
claiming that a patent is deemed valid until the court decides the opposite. It is also argued that it is in 
line with the public policy that favours dispute settlement. However, competition authorities are 
critical of such settlements, arguing that the originator company in fact pays off its competitor to stay 
out of the market, substantially delaying generic competition. It is claimed that patent litigation may 
result in the invalidation of a weak patent, eliminating unlawful monopoly as a result, and thus 
generic company could enter the market earlier. Instead the competitors decide to settle and share 
unlawful market monopoly profits – the benefit of both parties is, however, to the detriment of the 
consumer as it has to pay monopoly price for a longer period. 
 
																																								 																				
12  European Commission, ‘Pharmaceutical Sector Inquiry: Final Report’ (8 July 2009) (Pharmaceutical Sector Inquiry) 
<http://ec.europa.eu/competition/sectors/pharmaceuticals/inquiry/staff_working_paper_part1.pdf> accessed 10 May 
2016.  
13  OECD, ‘Annex to the Summary Record of the 121st Meeting of the Competition Committee held on 18-19 June 
2014. DAF/COMP/M(2014)2/ANN6/FINAL’ (10 February 2015) 
<http://www.oecd.org/officialdocuments/publicdisplaydocumentpdf/?cote=DAF/COMP/M%282014%292/ANN6/FI
NAL&doclanguage=en> accessed 10 May 2016. 	
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In the US pay-for-delay agreements have been litigated by the FTC for the last decade in different 
appellate circuits that employed different tests of assessment (i.e. per se illegality, scope of patent test, 
rule of reason and quick look test) and focusing on different facts (presumption of patent validity, 
transfer of funds etc.) that led to divergent outcomes. Finally, in 2013, the US Supreme Court 
provided some guidance in its landmark FTC v. Actavis decision, where it held that these type of 
agreements are not immune from antitrust scrutiny and firmly rejected the settled ‘scope of patent’ 
test largely used by the courts, as well as the FTC’s ‘quick look’ test, suggesting that reverse payment 
agreements must be analysed under the antitrust ‘rule of reason’ test.14  
 
As recently reported by the FTC the number of the potentially anti-competitive agreements has fallen 
significantly following the Supreme Court’s decision in FTC v. Actavis.15 The total number of such 
deals filed with the FTC has dropped to 21 in 2014 from 29 in 2013, and 40 in 2012 prior to the 
Actavis ruling. Also since the Actavis decision, the FTC announced a $1.2 billion settlement resolving 
its antitrust suit against Cephalon, Inc. for illegally blocking generic competition to its blockbuster 
sleep-disorder drug Provigil.16 
 
In the EU, reverse payment agreements have been subject to attention by the European Commission. 
In 2008 the European Commission carried out a sector inquiry into the pharmaceutical industry to 
investigate the reasons for the apparent lack of competition in the market for human medicines in 
Europe.17 The Commission identified reverse payment agreements as one of the practices that delay 
generic competition. Since the Pharmaceutical Sector Inquiry the Commission has carried out annual 
patent settlement monitoring exercises, the main purpose of which is to identify those that potentially 
unduly delay market entry of generic medicines to the detriment of the EU consumers. The proportion 
of potentially problematic patent settlements remains low, i.e. 12% in 2014 (11% in 2011, 7% in 2012 
and 8% in 2013).18 
 
The Commission also launched investigations and issued decisions against several pharmaceutical 
companies including fining Servier €330 million and several producers of generic medicines €97 
million in 2014 for delaying market entry of generic high blood pressure medicine perindopril; fining 
Johnson & Johnson and Novartis €16 million in 2013 for delaying market entry of generic pain-killer 
fentanyl and fining Lundbeck €93.8 million and several producers of generic medicines €52.2 million 
in 2013 for delaying market entry of generic antidepressant citalopram. The Commission found that in 
all three cases the agreements have caused consumer harm by delaying generic entry and maintaining 
unnecessarily high prices. The Lundbeck and Servier cases are currently under appeal.19 
																																								 																				
14  For the detailed analysis of this decision see Olga Gurgula, ‘US Supreme Court decision on reverse payment 
agreements: new era in patent litigation settlements – FTC v Actavis, Inc.’ (2013) Vol. 3 No. 4. Queen Mary Journal 
of Intellectual Property 325.	
15  The FTC Press Release, ‘FTC Report on Drug Patent Settlements Shows Potential Pay-for-Delay Deals Decreased 
Substantially in the First Year Since Supreme Court’s Actavis Decision’ (13 January 2016) 
<https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2016/01/ftc-report-drug-patent-settlements-shows-potential-pay-
delay> accessed 10 May 2016.  
16  The FTC Press Release, ‘FTC Settlement of Cephalon Pay for Delay Case Ensures $1.2 Billion in Ill-Gotten Gains 
Relinquished; Refunds Will Go To Purchasers Affected By Anticompetitive Tactics’ (28 May 2015) 
<https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2015/05/ftc-settlement-cephalon-pay-delay-case-ensures-12-
billion-ill> accessed 10 May 2016.  
17  Pharmaceutical Sector Inquiry (n 12). 
18  http://ec.europa.eu/competition/sectors/pharmaceuticals/inquiry/. 
19  http://ec.europa.eu/competition/sectors/pharmaceuticals/antitrust_en.html. 
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Other jurisdictions have also started to pay an interest in this type of agreement. In 2014, the 
Competition Commission of India (CCI) began scrutinising and investigating pharmaceutical patent 
settlement agreements between originator and generic companies for potential anti-competitive 
effects.20 The CCI is examining two sets of settlements resolving patent litigation in India that involve 
U.S, Swiss and Indian companies.21 In 2015 China’s National Development and Reform Commission 
announced that the regulator will pay attention to abuse of intellectual property rights in the 
pharmaceutical industry, including pay-for-delay agreements.22 
 
 
2.1.2. Anti-competitive unilateral strategies  
 
In order to extend market monopoly, pharmaceutical companies employ various strategic patenting 
practices to delay generic entry. Such strategies include patent thickets (or patent clustering), product 
switching and defensive patenting.23 Competition enforcement in this context has the potential to 
compensate for the failures of the IP and regulatory systems.24 However, although competition 
enforcement is crucial in these cases, nevertheless such practices lack the attention of competition 
authorities.  
 
 
(a) Patent thickets  
 
Patent thickets, also known as patent clusters, allow originator companies to extend patent protection 
of their product to a maximum. This is usually done via multiple filings of patent applications often 
with overlapping claims on new formulations, processes, additional pharmaceutical indications and 
forms.25 Such practices create numerous layers of protection and, if the competitor invalidates the 
basic patent before it expires other patents in the patent thickets, may still preclude generic market 
entry. One aspect of patent thickets is divisional patent applications that occur when the applicant 
divides a parent patent application into one or more narrower patent applications (this may happen 
either voluntarily or at the request of a patent office).26 
 
The denser the web of patents in the patent thickets the more difficult for the generic company to 
enter the market with its generic equivalent. Although there is an understanding that many of the 
patents in such patent thickets might be declared invalid if challenged, there is an absence of certainty 
about which of them are weak and at risk of being litigated, and which are strong and will be 
																																								 																				
20  http://www.livemint.com/Companies/RVVDhRh7oTfpqlIphkb6jM/CCI-to-scan-drug-patent-settlements.html. 
21  https://www.wsgr.com/WSGR/Display.aspx?SectionName=publications/PDFSearch/wsgralert-CCI.htm. 
22  http://mlexmarketinsight.com/editors-picks/chinas-ndrc-faces-challenges-in-scrutiny-of-pharma-pay-for-delay-
agreements/. 
23  Other strategies include disinformation tactics, refusal to give access to essential patents, intervention before the 
regulatory bodies, sham litigation, etc. 
24  OECD, DAF/COMP/M(2014)2/ANN6/FINAL (n 13).  
25  Pharmaceutical Sector Inquiry (n 12) para 491. 
26  European Commission, ‘Executive Summary of the Pharmaceutical Sector Inquiry Report’ (2008) 
<http://ec.europa.eu/competition/sectors/pharmaceuticals/inquiry/communication_en.pdf>  accessed 10 May 2016; 
See also UNCTAD, ‘The role of competition in the pharmaceutical sector and its benefits for consumers’ (2015) 
<http://unctad.org/meetings/en/SessionalDocuments/tdrbpconf8d3_en.pdf> accessed 10 May 2016. 
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infringed upon the entrance to the market. Thus, the generic company has two choices: either to wait 
until all patents in the patent thicket expire, or enter the market and run the risk of litigation. These 
patent thickets are also used by originator companies as a tool to threaten and/or commence patent 
infringement litigation that might create considerable obstacles to the market entry of generics via 
legal and search costs and court injunctions that prevent the sale of the generic product.27	
 
One example of patent thickets can be found in the Abbott’s patenting practices relating to its two key 
antiretroviral drugs for the management of HIV: ritonavir (Norvir) and lopinavir/ritonavir (Kaletra). 
108 patents were identified that protect these two drugs. Abbott Laboratories’ Norvir (ritonavir) was 
approved by the Food and Drug Administration in 1996, and Kaletra (lopinavir/ritonavir) was 
approved in 2000. The base compound for ritonavir was protected by the patent filed in 1995, 
originating from patent applications dating back to 1989. Including patent term adjustments and 
extensions, the expected patent expiration for the active ingredient in ritonavir was 2014. The patent 
for the active ingredient in lopinavir was first filed in 1995 and has an expected expiration date of 
2016. It is estimated that all 108 patents together can delay generic competition until at least 2028 - 
twelve years after the expiration of the patents on the drugs’ base compounds and thirty-nine years 
after the first patents on ritonavir were filed. Amin and Kesselheim argue that some of the secondary 
patents were found to be of questionable inventiveness with overlapping claims.28 The study shows 
that generic versions of Kaletra will not be available in the US for few more years, despite already 
being on the market in India for several years. 
 
 
(b) Product switching 
 
Product switching (or product hopping) is a practice of originator companies that involves the 
introduction of a new version of a patented drug that will shortly face expiration of a patent 
protection. Although this might seem to be a beneficial change, as the consumer will get the new 
improved version of the older drug, this nevertheless may raise competition concerns. In the situation 
when the new version of the drug enjoys longer patent protection, whereas the patent protection of the 
older drug will soon expire, the originator company has an incentive to switch doctors and patients 
from the first generation drug to the second generation. In order to induce such product switch 
originator companies may employ different tactics, such as withdrawing the old drug from the market, 
raising the relative price of the old drug, or promoting the new drug differentially. 
 
In some jurisdictions where pharmacies are allowed to swap the generic equivalent for a branded drug 
(the substitution rules) a withdrawal of the old version of a drug means that physicians will cease to 
prescribe it. This effectively eliminates the possibility of substitution, and as a result blocks generic 
competition.29 In State of New York v. Activis, for example, the 2nd Circuit found that product hopping 
amounted to an antitrust violation when the older product was withdrawn from the market.30  
																																								 																				
27  Ibid. 
28  Tahir Amin, Aaron S. Kesselheim, ‘Secondary Patenting Of Branded Pharmaceuticals: A Case Study Of How 
Patents On Two HIV Drugs Could Be Extended For Decades’ (2012) Vol.31, No.10 Health Affairs, 2286 
<http://content.healthaffairs.org/content/31/10/2286.long> accessed 10 May 2016; See also Chilton, Adam S., 
‘India's Evolving Patent Laws and the WTO Obligations: The Rejection of Abbott Laboratories' Application for a 
New Kaletra Patent’ (2011) Journal Articles, Paper 4281 
<http://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/journal_articles/4281> accessed 10 May 2016. 
29  GN Addy and E Douglas, ‘Canada considers hopping on board with a product-hopping case’ (2014)  Vol. 3, No. 2 
Competition Policy International, Antitrust Chronicle Competition Policy; See also OECD, ‘Summary Record of the 
Discussion on Competition and Generic Pharmaceuticals’ (2014) 
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(c) Defensive patenting  
 
As defined by the European Commission in its Pharmaceutical Sector Inquiry, defensive patenting 
occurs when the originator company maintains and uses patents to block the development of a new, 
competing product rather than to protect its own invention.31 It refers to inventions which the applying 
company considers to have little or no prospect of being developed and commercialised, and which, 
once granted, the company holds primarily to protect itself against actual or potential competition. As 
one of the companies’ corporate documentations stated: 
 
Defensive patents … serve to protect compounds closely related to [our company's] candidates 
or products. They do not cover [our company's] candidates or products. They protect 
compounds that would be of interest to a direct competitor. 
 
The fact that pharmaceutical companies may apply for patents to protect their inventions is a just and 
lawful right granted by patent law in order to reward the innovator. However, in circumstances, when 
a company uses patent strategies that interfere with the development of competing medicines and 
these strategies focus on excluding competitors without pursuing innovative efforts, such strategies 
should raise competition law concerns as being exclusionary. These patenting practices block 
dynamic competition and deprive consumers of access to new medicines.  
 
	
2.1.3. Competition law rules and abuses of IP by pharmaceutical companies 
 
In the leading jurisdictions competition law contains provisions that deal with anti-competitive 
contracts and unilateral practices. Section 1 of the Sherman Act and Article 101 of the TFEU prohibit 
anti-competitive agreements between competitors that restrict competition. An agreement between an 
originator and its potential generic competitors that prevents generic entry in exchange for a value 
transfer from the originator is a restriction of competition contrary to Section 1 of the Sherman Act 
and Article 101 of the TFEU. 
 
Anti-competitive practices of pharmaceutical companies that enjoy a dominant position are dealt with 
under Section 2 of the Sherman Act and Article 102 of the TFEU and, despite some variations in the 
treatment of monopoly power, they both condemn abuses of such monopoly, including abuses of 
intellectual property rights. Despite being a legal monopoly, intellectual property will not escape 
competition law enforcement when the exercise of IP is deemed anti-competitive. Thus, these 
provisions may be relevant to strategic patenting. A few modest steps were taken in this respect in the 
cases of product switching, but competition authorities are still hesitant to intervene into the 
evergreening and patent thickets practices, fearing that this might damage the fragile balance between 
the competition and incentive to innovate.  
 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																												
<http://www.oecd.org/officialdocuments/publicdisplaydocumentpdf/?cote=DAF/COMP/M%282014%292/ANN3/FI
NAL&doclanguage=en> accessed 10 May 2016.  
30  State of New York v. Actavis PLC, No. 14-4624 (2nd Cir. May 22, 2015). 
31  Pharmaceutical Sector Inquiry (n 12) para 1117. 
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When dealing with these practices developing countries should use competition law more rigorously 
in order to prevent delays of generic competition. Defining competition law objectives, as well as 
defining relevant pharmaceutical market narrowly may be useful practical steps toward the facilitation 
of access to medicines.   
 
 
 
Conclusions  
	
Abuses of intellectual property rights, such as reverse payment agreements and strategic patenting, 
risk allowing pharmaceutical companies to extend their market monopoly by blocking the entry of 
both generic and innovative medicines and, as a result, stifling competition and harming consumers. 
One way to deal with these practices is through the improvement of the patent system, for example by 
raising the bar of patentability requirements and increasing the registration fees. While some changes 
may indeed decrease the scale of the abuse, it will not resolve the problem entirely or even may create 
new difficulties. For instance, strengthening patentability requirements may harm innovation. While it 
might be potentially beneficial for generic competition as the number of patents in patent thickets may 
potentially decrease, it may also lead to the difficulties of inventing around. This can affect other 
innovator companies that work in the same field trying to develop substitute products without facing 
patent infringement. Therefore, although some changes to the patent system will be important in order 
to reduce the number of weak and potentially invalid patents,32 such changes should be implemented 
with caution.33  
 
The counter argument, raised by pharmaceutical companies, is that IP strategies are in line with patent 
law, and therefore legal. If the invention meets the patentability requirements, the company is entitled 
to a patent. And once the patent is granted the owner has the right to protect its invention by excluding 
its competitors. That well may be so, but this does not take into account the abuse of the patent system 
in general. Patent law is neither equipped with the necessary legal tools that would enable it to deal 
with the abusive practices, nor it is the aim of this body of law. The purpose of patent filings, as well 
as the further use of these patents is beyond the scope of the patent system.  
 
Competition law, on the other hand, may be an effective tool in dealing with these types of practices. 
In the pharmaceutical industry, competition policy benefits consumers in the form of increased access 
to affordable medicines by detecting, halting, and correcting anti-competitive practices.34 Even 
immature and inexperienced regimes can gain successful results by resolving cases of excessive prices 
																																								 																				
32  According to the Pharmaceutical Sector Inquiry, para 501: 
 
As later shown the final outcome in 60% of opposition and appeal procedures against originator company's patents 
examined in this report was a revocation of the disputed patent. In addition to this, the scope of the patents was 
reduced in another 15%. These procedures almost exclusively concerned secondary patents. Furthermore in 55% of 
the patent litigation cases between originator and generic companies that involved a question of the disputed 
patent's validity and that reached a final judgement, the patents were annulled (43 of 78 cases). 
33  A toolbox has been designed for developing countries to shape the broad scope of exclusive rights before a patent is 
issued (pre-grant) and after a patent has been granted (post-grant), and thus ensure the accessibility of generic 
medications. See UNCTAD, ‘Using Intellectual Property Rights to Stimulate Pharmaceutical Production in 
Developing Countries: A Reference Guide’ (2011) New York and Geneva, United Nations publication 
<http://unctad.org/en/pages/PublicationArchive.aspx?publicationid=437> accessed 10 May 2016.  
34  UNCTAD, ‘The role of competition in the pharmaceutical sector and its benefits for consumers’ (2015) 
<http://unctad.org/meetings/en/SessionalDocuments/tdrbpconf8d3_en.pdf> 10 May 2016. 
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on essential medicines. Nowadays, competition authorities in developed countries and some 
developing countries are dealing with important issues of restrictive agreements and abuses of 
dominance in the pharmaceutical industry. However, some of the practices of pharmaceutical 
companies that delay and even block generic and innovative competition still lack attention. Practices 
such as reverse payment agreements and strategic patenting should become the focus of greater 
attention by competition agencies around the world.  
 
Countries should be able to retain freedom to utilise to the full flexibilities available in the TRIPS 
Agreement to ensure access to medicines. Existing or future trade and investment treaties must not 
undermine these flexibilities. In addition to in-built flexibilities in the TRIPS Agreement, countries 
should be able to utilise competition law to facilitate access to medicines. Tools that can contribute to 
this include: the existence of flexibilities in any future international harmonised competition law 
instrument; best practices and model laws to consolidate competition law enforcement globally; fact-
finding missions by international organisations to provide information on the current status of 
competition law, its application in the pharmaceutical sector and its impact on access to medicines; 
the design and delivery of analytical tools that can be used by competition authorities seeking to 
identify potentially abusive practices in the pharmaceutical sector; and technical assistance, capacity 
building and best practice to contribute to the delivery of more effective policies on potentially 
abusive practices in the pharmaceutical sector in support of access to medicines. 
